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Statement of Contribution 
 
What is already known on this subject? 
• Developmental research has explored the benefits of parent mental state talk for children’s 
emerging understanding of the mind. 
• Yet, few studies have systematically investigated relations between the specific referent of 
parental mental state input and children’s developing mental state talk. 
 
What does this study add? 
• The present results showed that parents’ production of self-referent and child-referent 
cognitive talk were both related to preschoolers’ cognitive talk during a collaborative puzzle-
solving task. 
• Importantly, the presence of conflicting perspectives mediated the relations between parents’ 
self-referent cognitive talk and child cognitive talk. 
• These findings highlight an important mechanism through which parents’ references to their 


















We examined the relations between the referent of parents and preschoolers’ mental state 
talk during a collaborative puzzle-solving task (N = 146 dyads; n = 81 3-year-olds, n = 65 4-year-
olds). The results showed that parents’ references to their own knowledge and beliefs (self-referent 
cognitive talk), and references to their child’s knowledge and beliefs (child-referent cognitive talk) 
were both related to children’s (primarily self-referent) cognitive talk. We then tested whether any 
of the observed relations could be explained by the presence of conflicting perspectives within the 
collaborative interaction. Mediational analyses revealed that conflicting perspectives mediated the 
positive relation between parents’ production of self-referent cognitive talk and child cognitive 
talk. By contrast, the positive relation between parents’ production of child-referent cognitive talk 
and child cognitive talk did not depend on the presence of this type of conflict. These findings 
highlight an important mechanism through which parents’ references to their own mind might 
promote children’s developing mental state talk in collaborative contexts. 
	
Keywords:  
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Conflicting perspectives mediate the relation between parents’ and preschoolers’ self-
referent mental state talk during collaboration 
Social interactionist theories of development suggest that children’s language, cognitive, 
and social skills develop as a result of interacting with caregivers and parents (Bruner, 1982; 
Vygotsky, 1978). A substantial effort in developmental research has highlighted the benefits of 
early parent-child interactions for children’s understanding of (typically) unobservable social and 
cognitive processes, such as the beliefs, desires and emotions that might motivate an individual’s 
behavior (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Nelson, 2005; Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002). A recent meta-
analysis revealed that parent mental state talk has a modest, significant influence on children’s 
developing theory-of-mind abilities (i.e., false belief and emotion understanding; Tompkins, 
Benigno, Kiger Lee, & Wright, 2018). Importantly, this research has suggested that increases in 
the frequency of parent talk about the mind has a direct causal influence on children’s developing 
vocabulary regarding mental states (Jenkins, Turrell, Kogushi, Lollis, & Ross, 2003; Taumoepeau 
& Ruffman, 2008) and on their social understanding more generally (Appleton & Reddy, 1996; 
Gross et al., 2015; Hughes et al., 2005).  
Despite the extended focus on the role of parent mental state language in promoting 
relevant child outcomes, the contribution of whose mental state is being referred to – that is, 
whether the parent refers to the child’s mental state or that of another person – has been somewhat 
overlooked (Tompkins et al., 2018). This distinction could be theoretically important in identifying 
the different mechanisms through which parental talk contributes to children’s mental state 
understanding. Specifically, it would delineate when pointing to the child’s own perspective versus 
the perspectives of others might be a more significant driver of children’s developing talk about 
the mind or, alternatively, could confirm that any talk about mental states is sufficient.  
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There is some evidence from previous research that child-directed mental state talk is 
uniquely predictive of longitudinal measures of their mental state abilities. A body of work has 
shown that parent talk which appropriately interprets the mind of their infants (i.e., “mind-
mindedness”) predicts children’s performance on theory-of-mind measures in subsequent years 
(Meins, Fernyhough, Arnott, Leekam, & de Rosnay, 2013). However, only a few studies have 
systematically coded and tested the effects of this feature of parent mental state talk. Taumoepeau 
and Ruffman (2006, 2008) found that mothers’ talk about their child’s desires and needs at 15 
months was predictive of children’s mental state language proficiency at 2 years of age, but that 
mothers’ references to the thoughts and knowledge of others (i.e., characters in a picture-book) 
were more important for child mental state talk at age 3. In a related study, Adrian, Clemente, and 
Villanueva (2007) revealed that mothers’ reflections about the mental states of storybook 
characters was the most consistent predictor of  3- to 6-year-olds’ theory-of-mind understanding 
one year later. The authors argue that this developmental shift in the benefits of parents’ initial 
references to their child’s mind, followed by their references to the minds of others aligns with 
Vygotsky’s (1978) zone of proximal development. In other words, parents are continually 
scaffolding their child’s developing understanding of inner psychological states (from their own 
to those of another person) throughout this crucial period (Adrian et al., 2007; Taumoepeau & 
Ruffman, 2006, 2008). 
Taken together, these longitudinal findings indicate that the specific referent of parental 
mental state talk could also be an important factor for young children’s developing mental state 
talk in situated dyadic interactions. For example, parents’ proclivity to mark their child’s own 
mental states during conversation could promote child talk in a certain situation because it is 
helpful in making explicit representational links between the child’s internal experiences and their 
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behavior (Kirk et al., 2015). In comparison, parent conversational references to the perspectives 
of others highlight the independent and potentially differing viewpoints that may not be readily 
available to the child (Harris, 1996, 2005), and thus could feasibly also encourage children’s use 
of mental state language in a given situation.  
The first aim of the present research was to test for these associations between the specific 
referent of parent talk and children’s use of mental state terms. Based on previous findings that 
young children tend to produce more mental state references to their own perspective during 
interactions with their parents (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Hughes, Marks, Ensor, and Lecce, 
2010), we decided to focus on children’s production of mental state talk more generally (and not 
on the referent of such talk). The second aim was to explore the role of a potential mechanism 
through which the subject of parents’ mental state language promotes child mental state talk in 
early interactions. To accomplish this, we tested for patterns of talk in a collaborative puzzle-
solving context in which parent’s mental state references could either be consistent with the child’s 
current perspective and behavior or present a conflicting mental perspective to that of the child. 
Collaborative interaction partners often need to discuss, and potentially reconcile, different 
perspectives in the pursuit of a shared understanding or common goal (Fernyhough, 2008; Harris, 
2005). Previous research has demonstrated that preschool children make a variety of references to 
mental states during instances of emotional and behavioral conflict with parents and their peers 
(Comparini, Douglas, & Perez, 2014; Dunn, Slomkowski, Donelan, & Herrera, 1995) and found a 
positive association between 3- to 6-year-old children’s references to their own inner states (e.g., 
thoughts, desires) and the number of conflict episodes recorded in conversations with their mother 
(Hughes et al., 2010). However, to our knowledge, there has been no work investigating whether 
PARENT-CHILD COLLABORATIVE MENTAL STATE TALK 
7 
	
the presence of conflicting perspectives accounts for the relation between the referent of parents’ 
mental state talk and children’s production of mental state talk. 
We explored whether the presence of conflicting perspectives acted as a potential 
mechanism to explain the relation between the specific referent of parents’ mental state talk - 
talk that either refers to their own mental perspective (self-referent) or their child’s mental 
perspective (child-referent) - and children’s use of mental state language during a joint puzzle-
solving task. Drawing from theoretical accounts about the function of parents’ references to 
perspectives that are distinct to that of their child’s (Harris, 1996, 2005; Harris, De Rosnay, & 
Pons, 2005), we reasoned that observed relations between parents’ self-referent mental state talk 
and children’s mental state talk might be especially apparent when one or both partners need to 
explicitly address differing perspectives (e.g., “I don’t think it goes that way”). In comparison, 
because parent references to their child’s mental state only labels the point of view or goals of 
the child, the relation between parent child-referent mental state talk and child mental state talk 
may not depend on the presence of shifting perspectives. 
For a number of reasons, the present focus was on discourse concerning the content and 
certainty of knowledge, which is sometimes labelled cognitive talk (e.g., “to think”, “to 
remember”, “to believe”). First, cognitive talk is a useful linguistic tool in reconciling incongruous 
perspectives between interaction partners. Moreover, previous research has indicated that both 
parental talk about knowledge and beliefs, as well as the sophistication of young children’s own 
cognitive talk (Moore & Frye, 1991), is more closely related to theory-of-mind development when 
compared to other talk about mental states (e.g., emotion talk; Tompkins et al, 2018). In addition, 
one recent study that coded for a variety of parent and 4-year-old children’s mental state comments 
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when solving a puzzle task suggested that cognitive talk is produced quite frequently yet variably 
in this context (see Lundy & Fyfe, 2016). 
We tested our predictions when children’s cognitive talk undergoes significant 
development in the preschool years, i.e., 3- to 4-years of age (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Jenkins 
et al., 2003). We first hypothesized that there could be two association patterns between the 
referent of parent cognitive talk and preschoolers’ general use of cognitive talk: 1) By prompting 
children to reflect on their internal experiences and how they could be related to the task at hand, 
parents’ child-referent cognitive talk (e.g., “Do you know…?”), would be related to child talk 
about beliefs and 2) by making the viewpoint of the interaction partner explicit with relation to the 
joint task, parent self-referent cognitive talk (e.g., “I think that…”) could also be related to 
children’s cognitive talk. However, we expected that 3) because self-referent cognitive talk might 
become especially salient during conversations that involve incongruous perspectives (e.g., “I 
don’t think that’s right”), A) any relations between parents’ self-referent and child cognitive talk 
would be mediated by the presence of conflicting perspectives but that B) relations between 
parents’ references to their child’s knowledge state and child cognitive talk will not be mediated 
by the presence of such conflict when solving the puzzle task. We define conflict in the present 
study as any utterance or series of utterances through which the parent or child communicate a 




One hundred and forty-six parents (n = 144 mothers) and their children (72 boys, Mage = 
3;11, age range = 2;10 – 4;11) were recruited from a participant database at a university lab. 
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Although detailed demographic information was not obtained, families recruited from this 
database tend to be White and middle to upper middle income, with at least one parent possessing 
a four-year college degree. The families are recruited from both urban and suburban areas around 
a medium sized city in New England, United States. Participants were part of a broader study 
investigating children’s social learning. All parent-child dyads completed the joint puzzle task 
before completing two social learning tasks. We only coded and analyzed families’ participation 
in the puzzle task for the current study.  Ten additional families completed the puzzle task phase 
but were not included in the present analyses because they did not speak English during the 
interaction (n = 4), produced no or very minimal dialogue (n = 2; < 10 utterances) or the child was 
distracted throughout the session (n = 4). 
Materials and Procedure 
The parent-child dyads were asked to collaboratively solve a gender-neutral jigsaw puzzle 
targeted for 3+ year-old children (i.e., Melissa and Doug’s 24-piece “African Plains Wooden 
Jigsaw Puzzle”). The experimenter brought the parent and child to a room with a table and two 
chairs. The unassembled puzzle was on the table. The experimenter then told the parent and child: 
“Ok, to start, you get to do this puzzle. You can sit down at this table, and we’d like you to do this 
puzzle together. I’ll be back in a few minutes, and then we’ll move on to the next part of the study” 
The experimenter then left the room and the parent-child interaction was video recorded. After 
three minutes, the experimenter returned and said, “All right, awesome job!” before putting away 
the puzzle to begin the next task. 
Coding 
Transcription. Sessions were video-recorded and transcribed by trained research 
assistants using the CHAT conventions of the Child Language Data Exchange System (CHILDES; 
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MacWhinney, 2000). The interactions were transcribed at the level of the utterance, i.e., a series 
of words followed by a pause or change in conversational turn. A second research assistant verified 
the transcripts to ensure accuracy and any disagreements were resolved through discussion.  
Cognitive talk. We developed a coding scheme based on past studies examining the 
content of parents’ and children’s mental state talk at the level of the utterance (Adrian et al., 2007; 
Jenkins et al, 2003). Cognitive talk was defined as utterances that contained words that denoted a 
person’s thoughts, memories or knowledge (e.g., “to know”, “to wonder”, “to guess”). All 
variations of these cognitive mental state words (henceforth referred to only as “cognitive” words) 
were counted, including certain terms that have sometimes been excluded in previous studies 
because they were considered to only function as conversational devices (e.g., “What do you 
think?” for turn-taking; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). However, in line with other related research 
(e.g., see Harris, Yang, & Cui, 2017; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2008), in the context of our study, 
we could not definitively rule out the possibility that these utterances reflect genuine mental state 
references and therefore could encourage cognitive talk among adults and children1. This coding 
yielded a total of 1,318 parent and child cognitive utterances across the entire sample. To control 
for the role of imitative learning within the interaction, cognitive utterances which involved self-
repetitions or a direct repetition of the other individual’s utterance were not counted. 
Each cognitive utterance then received a second code for either referring to the self (e.g., 
“I think this is the right place for it!”, “I decided to do this part first”, “I wonder if we have that 
																																																						
1 The phrase “You know what?” used in isolation was not coded as cognitive. We reasoned that 
this term was used to gain the child’s attention and not to refer to their underlying knowledge 
state.  
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correct”), the other individual (“Do you remember this?”, “You’ve figured it out”, “Where do you 
think this piece goes?”), or the collective dyad (e.g., “We don’t know if we have the corners in the 
right places”). Note that these categories were not always mutually exclusive and cognitive 
utterances could be coded as, for example, referring to both the self and the other (e.g., “I think 
you have a good idea”). However, we found that the cognitive talk that occurred during the 
collaborative task was rarely coded as including more than one type of referent (n = 15 parent 
utterances; n = 1 child utterance contained more than one referent).  
Conflicting perspectives. Each dyad received a code for whether or not they experienced 
a conflict of perspectives during the course of the puzzle task. A conflict of perspectives was 
defined as at least one instance in which either the parent or child used cognitive talk to disagree 
with the other person or to highlight an explicitly incongruous or contradictory perspective in 
response to the other person’s action. Table 1 presents brief examples of conflicting perspectives 
with relation to this specific task. We coded conflict in a binary manner (i.e., Presence of 
conflicting perspectives = 1, No conflicting perspectives present = 0) because the task was 
relatively short and thus would presumably not allow for sufficient variance in the number of 
individual conflict statements within dyads for the main analyses. Approximately half of the dyads 
(51.37%) were coded as experiencing a conflict of perspectives during the puzzle task. 
Reliability. For the coding of cognitive utterances, the first author initially coded 20% of 
the transcripts and two trained research assistants, unaware of the predictions of the study, 
performed reliability coding. Average agreement between coders for both whether an utterance 
included a cognitive term and the referent of that cognitive term was very high (92% agreement,  
k = .91 and 91% agreement, k = .87 respectively). The two research assistants then coded the 
remainder of the transcripts.  
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The first and second author coded the transcripts for whether or not the dyad experienced 
a conflict of perspectives in completing the puzzle. A trained research assistant, unaware of the 
hypotheses of the study, performed reliability coding on 20% of the transcripts and agreement 
between the coders was very high (90% agreement, k = .80). Any disagreements were resolved by 
discussion between the research assistants and the first author. 
 
Table 1. Brief examples of a conflict of perspectives during the joint puzzle-solving task. 
Presence of Conflicting Perspectives No Conflict of Perspectives Present 
Child: “I think this goes here” 
[Child attempts to force piece into the same spot] 
Parent: “I don’t think so hon” 
 
Parent: “Did you find two that fit?” 
Child: “Yeah!” 
Parent: “How did you know that?” 
Child: “Cause it has a zebra on it” 
 
[Child keeps trying to fit pieces on puzzle] 
Parent: “Listen, look at the piece. Do you think it is in the 
right position? Do you think the corner could go somewhere 
else?” 
[Child moves piece around the puzzle] 
 
Parent: “Do you think those go together?” 
[Child takes one piece off the board] 
Child: “No” 
Parent: “No, I don’t think so” 
Parent: “We might have to switch things around” 
Child: “No, I think that goes…” 
Parent: “Okay”” 
Child: “I see just the right pieces!” 
Parent: “I think you’re close” 
[Child tries fitting pieces together] 
 
Child: “Those go here and then like this. But how do you 
make…” 
Parent: “No, remember what goes here? Do you remember 
what goes on the sides here?” 
 
Parent: “What do you think this puzzle is going to be 
of?” 
[Child picks up a piece] 
Child: “Hmm, uh, a tiger” 




The Referent of Cognitive Talk (CT) during Collaboration 
There was no significant effect of child gender for the raw frequency and proportion of 
utterances coded as cognitive talk (now referred to as “CT”; all p’s > .18); therefore, all subsequent 
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analyses did not include gender. All parents (with the exception of one parent) produced at least 
one utterance related to knowledge and beliefs (M utterances per parent = 7.84, SD = 4.46, range 
= 0-21, 13.06% of total utterances). On average, parents were equally likely to refer to their own 
(M = 3.68, SD = 2.74, range = 0-16, 6.21% of total utterances) and their child’s knowledge states 
(M = 3.97, SD = 3.11, range = 0-17, 6.56% of total utterances): the results of within-subjects t-
tests did not reveal any differences between parents’ self-referent CT and child-referent CT (raw 
frequency of utterances: t(145) = .90, p = .37; proportion out of total utterances: t(145) = .65, p = 
.52).   
Over half of the children (58%) engaged in CT during the task (M utterances per child = 
1.18, SD = 1.37, range = 0-6, 5.28% of total utterances; note that these and the following 
descriptive statistics represent all of the children who participated, including those who never 
produced CT during the interaction). In contrast to parents, the mean CT that children produced in 
a given interaction was much more likely to reference their own perspective (child self-referent 
CT: M = 1.05, SD = 1.28, range = 0-6, 4.74% of total utterances; child parent-referent CT: M = 
.12, SD = .36, range = 0-2, .45% of total utterances). We decided to retain and collapse the few 
instances of child parent-referent CT in the variable of child CT.  
References to a collective mental state (e.g., “We have to figure it out”) were relatively 
rare for the dyads (n = 44 parent utterances; n = 4 child utterance were coded as collective CT). 
Thus, the relations between this specific kind of parent talk and child CT were not explored further. 
The collective-referent CT was only retained in the parent and child measures of total CT (i.e. was 
not counted in the individual measures of parents’ self-referent and/or child-referent CT). To 
control for variation in the amount of talk the dyads produced while completing the puzzle, we 
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include the main parent and child measures of CT as a proportion of their total utterances in the 
main analyses. 
Relations between the Referent of Parent CT and Child CT during Collaboration 
The proportion of children’s CT was not related to children’s age in months (r(144) = .12, 
p = .15). The proportion of parents’ self-referent CT was also not related to children’s age (r(144) 
= -.05, p = .56) but the proportion of parents’ child-referent CT was positively associated with 
child age, r(144) = .21, p = .01. Table 2 presents the relations between the variables of interest 
when controlling for the age of the child.  
The proportion of parents’ self-referent and child-referent CT were both positively 
associated with children’s proportion of total CT and to the children’s CT that specifically 
referenced the child’s own beliefs. This latter finding indicated that our decision to collapse the 
child parent-referent CT in the main outcome variable of child CT did not significantly change the 
observed relations between parent and child CT.  
In addition, we found that parents’ production of self-referent and child-referent CT had a 
very low, non-significant correlation (r(144) = .05, p = .53).  We could thus consider them as 
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Table 2. Partial correlations between the proportion of parent and child cognitive talk measures 
when controlling for children’s age in months. 
 Child 
 Total Self-referent 
Parent    
    Total  .33***  .32*** 
    Self-referent  .25** .24** 
    Child-referent .23** .22** 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Do Conflicting Perspectives Mediate the Relation between the Referent of Parent CT and 
Child CT during Collaboration? 
To test our predictions about the relations between the referent of parent CT and child CT 
when collaborating on a joint task, we conducted two mediation models. We first examined 
whether the presence of conflicting perspectives (binary variable) mediated the observed relations 
between the proportion of parent self-referent CT (continuous predictor) and proportion of child 
CT (continuous outcome). We then ran a second model in which we tested whether this type of 
conflict acted as a mediator between the proportion of parent child-referent CT and child CT. 
Children’s age in months was controlled for in all steps of the mediation models and the alpha 
levels were adjusted for these two sets of analyses (a = .05/2 = .025). 
The four mediation assumptions (Baron & Kenny, 1986) were met for the first mediation 
model: (1) the predictor variable (parent self-referent CT) was positively related to the outcome 
variable (child CT), β = .36, SE = 12, p =.002; (2) the predictor variable (parent self-referent CT) 
was positively related to the mediating variable (presence of conflicting perspectives), β = 
17.81, SE = 4.65, p < .001; (3) the mediating variable (presence of conflicting perspectives) was 
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positively related to the outcome variable (child CT), β = .03, SE = .01, p = .002; and (4) when 
controlling for the mediating variable (presence of conflicting perspectives), the predictor variable 
(parent self-referent CT) was no longer significantly related to the outcome variable (child CT; β 
= .24, SE = 12, p =.05). A Sobel test revealed that the presence of conflicting perspectives was a 
significant mediator of this association, z = 2.37, p = .02. Thus, experiencing a conflict of 
perspectives statistically accounted for the positive relation between parents’ production of CT 
referring to their own perspective and children’s production of CT when jointly solving a puzzle 
task (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. The relation between the proportion of parents’ self-referent cognitive talk (CT) and 
children’s CT among the dyads who (A) experienced a conflict of perspectives and (B) did not 
experience this type of conflict during the joint puzzle-solving task. Conflicting perspectives 
significantly mediated the positive relation between parents’ self-referent CT and child CT. Shaded 
areas represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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The mediation assumptions were not met when parent child-referent talk was entered as 
the predictor variable: this predictor was not related to the mediating variable of conflict (β = .63, 
SE = 3.49, p =.86) and the positive relation between this predictor and the child CT outcome 
remained significant after including the mediating variable into the model, β = .30, SE = .11, 
p =.006. Finally, a Sobel test confirmed that the presence of conflicting perspectives did not 
significantly mediate this association (z = .18, p = .86). Hence, the positive relation between 
parents’ production of CT that referred to their child’s perspective and children’s use of CT was 
not affected by the presence of conflicting perspectives in this task (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. The relation between the proportion of parents’ child-referent cognitive talk (CT) and 
children’s CT among the dyads who (A) experienced a conflict of perspectives and (B) did not 
experience this type of conflict during the joint puzzle-solving task. Conflicting perspectives did 
not mediate the positive relation between parents’ child-referent CT and child CT. Shaded areas 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 




The results revealed that preschoolers’ belief and knowledge talk was associated with 
parents’ talk about their own beliefs (i.e., “I think I know what that is…”) and their talk about the 
knowledge states of their children (e.g., “You know that…”). This finding supports past studies 
that parents’ references to the minds of their children and the minds of others can both play an 
important role in children’s developing mental state talk (Adrian et al., 2007; Taumoepeau & 
Ruffman, 2006, 2008) and significantly extends this work by demonstrating these association 
patterns within a situated puzzle-solving context. Importantly, the present research has pinpointed 
a feature of collaboration that might draw out and account for individual differences in children’s 
production of cognitive talk, i.e., the articulation of shifting perspectives in the pursuit of a 
common goal.  
The results showed that the presence of a juxtaposition between the perspective of the 
child and parent significantly mediated the relation between parents’ and children’s marking of 
their own beliefs states (because child cognitive talk largely referred to their own perspective). 
Thus, the association between parent and child talk about their own beliefs was situated within 
interactions in which the dyad communicated differing beliefs. To our knowledge, this is some of 
the first empirical evidence to confirm the theoretical assumption that parent talk about mental 
states that are distinct, and presumably less obvious, to their child’s perspective can be useful for 
children’s developing mental state talk (Harris, 1996, 2005; Harris et al., 2005). Furthermore, the 
present research suggests that situations which involve shifting perspectives (even brief moments 
of disagreement when solving a puzzle task) could be an important mechanism through which 
parental references to their own mind help to promote children’s reflection and talk about their 
own belief state. It further emphasizes the relevance of delineating the referent of mental state 
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talk – we observed that parents were equally likely to refer their own and their child’s knowledge 
state, that there was a low non-significant correlation between both kinds of talk and that the 
association patterns for parent self-referent and child-referent cognitive talk varied depending on 
the presence of conflicting perspectives.   
Although parent child-referent cognitive talk was sometimes used to address a perspective 
that differed to that of the child (see Table 1), the observed relation with child cognitive talk was 
not mediated by this occurrence. One possible interpretation of this finding is that the use of parent 
child-referent cognitive talk to resolve a juxtaposing belief when completing the puzzle (e.g., “Do 
you think the corner could go somewhere else?”) might not efficiently communicate the parents’ 
contrasting perspective to that of the child. Instead, it could be that parent references to their child’s 
mind might play a different role in this joint context. For example, given that these utterances were 
often in the form of a question (e.g., “Where do you think this piece goes?”), they might serve as 
a pedagogical move to encourage children’s autonomous actions (Lundy & Fyfe, 2016; Yu, 
Bonawitz, & Shafto, 2017). An additional explanation could be that parents’ attention to their 
children’s mental state serves to principally communicate an affective message and reinforce an 
affiliative bond (Meins et al., 2013). Therefore, child-directed mental state talk led to increases in 
child talk in a more general sense during this collaboration, regardless of whether the parent and 
child’s mental perspectives overlapped or were in conflict with one another. 
The current research examined relations between the referent of parent and children’s 
mental state discourse that occurred during one time point and when completing a specific type of 
collaborative task. Given the limited scope of this context, it would be important to investigate 
whether this pattern of findings hold in other interaction settings at home or whether the results 
are specific to a puzzle-solving task.	Future studies can also build on the present findings to reveal 
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whether the presence of conflicting perspectives continues to act as an important mechanism for 
children and their caregiver’s self-referent mental state talk over time. For instance, it could be 
that, as children’s discourse, awareness and understanding of mental states continues to develop 
in middle childhood (Grazzani & Ornaghi, 2012; Pons & Harris, 2005), requests about the 
knowledge state of an interaction partner (e.g., “How do you know?”) might be more frequent 
when that partner conveys a differing belief or perspective. Furthermore, future work should seek 
to replicate the present results when the occurrence of conflict between the perspective of the child 
and that of an interaction partner is experimentally manipulated and test whether the specific point 
at which a conflicting perspective occurs matters for child cognitive talk. The present research 
could also be meaningfully extended to examine how the referent of mental state talk during 
collaboration relates to children’s ability to effectively solve problems in cooperative dilemmas 
(Tomasello & Hamann, 2012). 
Children rarely referred to their parents’ perspective in the current task, but parents acted 
as both a collaborative partner and as a more knowledgeable and authoritative figure. Future work 
should explore the role of the referent of collaborative mental state talk in interactions beyond the 
parent-child dyad. For example, previous work has shown that young children are more likely to 
discuss the psychological states of the other person when communicating with a sibling versus 
their parent (Hughes et al., 2010). This finding suggests that interactions with more expert partners 
could constrain certain aspects of children’s mental state language and that the present pattern of 
results might differ when preschoolers collaborate with relatively less competent partners, such as 
siblings and peers (Hartup, 1979). Finally, similar to previous studies (Tompkins et al., 2018), the 
observed associations between parent and child mental state talk were modest. Hence, identifying 
the contribution of additional factors that could help explain relations between parent and child 
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collaborative mental state talk, for example, familiarity with the task at hand, socioeconomic status 
and individual variation in children’s verbal and socio-cognitive abilities, would be a worthy 
avenue for future investigation.    
To conclude, this study contributes to a corpus of research illustrating that different features 
of parental mental state talk might contribute to children’s developing mental state abilities in very 
specific ways. The present research suggests that when a conflict between the perspectives of 
partners arise during naturally occurring interactions, parent references to their own mind can 
facilitate their child’s talk about the mind. More broadly, these findings highlight the importance 
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